Massive missile strikes on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities have made Patriot one of the few systems proven capable of intercepting modern ballistic weapons. Yet having launchers solves nothing without missiles. And missiles are in constant short supply: the world produces up to 850 PAC-3 rounds per year, while at least two shots are needed per interception. The idea of localizing production of American interceptors in Ukraine has therefore become a pressing topic.

“We do not yet know the exact terms under which a license and technology transfer could take place. It is clear that such decisions are always accompanied by complex intergovernmental agreements. Ukraine must obtain the maximum possible capabilities without sacrificing its own strategic interests,” notes BlueBird Tech CEO Valerii Zarubin.

According to him, large-scale production begins not with equipment, but with a team of engineers and technologists capable of building a process from scratch. At the same time, Patriot must not become an end in itself that hinders the development of Ukraine’s own domestic school of missile engineering. 

On July 8, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara, US President Donald Trump signaled that Washington was ready to consider such a possibility, and on July 23 in Kyiv, Volodymyr Zelenskyy discussed cooperation prospects with the leadership of the primary manufacturer, Raytheon.

By the end of July, however, clarity had diminished: in an interview with the Financial Times, Trump stated that no final decision had been made and added a caveat — “we have to be very careful about who we allow [to produce Patriot].” Zelenskyy, meanwhile, hopes to receive the authorization by the end of 2026. In any case, negotiations are ongoing.

A License Is Not Production

Many Ukrainians have misread these reports, confusing the terms “authorization” and “production.” In reality, what is being discussed is merely the beginning of a lengthy process. If things move forward, the initial phase — licensing and transfer of technical documentation — will involve aligning production standards, quality control requirements, and mechanisms for coordinating with hundreds of component suppliers.

The PAC-3 MSE missile is a high-technology system: a solid-fuel engine, an active radar seeker, an onboard computer, inertial navigation, and a gas-dynamic control system that allows it to literally “hit a bullet with a bullet” at speeds of several kilometers per second.

The most expensive and complex components are the seeker (manufactured by Boeing) and the solid-fuel engine, whose production remains a bottleneck even for American industry. The PAC-3 MSE program lasted more than 14 years: from the start of development in 2004 to serial production in 2017.

The benchmark is the PAC-3 MSE production cycle in the United States itself: approximately 24 months from order to finished product, involving around 400 subcontractor companies. If Ukraine follows a similar path, a horizon of one and a half to two years appears realistic — provided that the political decision on the scope of technology to be transferred is made in the near term.

“I am convinced that the greatest value of this cooperation lies not only in the ability to produce Patriot. What matters most is preserving and building upon our own competencies, so that Ukraine continues to develop its own modern weapons systems rather than simply mastering those of others,” emphasized Valerii Zarubin.