Shaheds have become one of the most dangerous and systemic threats of modern warfare. These kamikaze drones are applied for engaging infrastructure, logistical routes, and rear objects, often at a significant distance from the front line. In response to such a threat, various counteraction assets are used, among which electronic warfare occupies an important but limited place.
What Shaheds Are and Why They Are a Difficult Target
Shaheds are kamikaze drones with a long flight range that use autonomous navigation systems and a pre-programmed route. For most of the flight, they do not require constant communication with an operator.
It is precisely autonomy that makes Shaheds a difficult target for electronic warfare. Unlike FPV drones or reconnaissance UAVs, which constantly exchange signals with an operator, Shaheds are able to continue moving even in conditions of the disruption of external radio communication.
How EW Is Applied Against Shaheds
In countering Shaheds, EW is not used as a means of direct destruction. The main area of impact is the creation of interference for satellite navigation, which is used for the correction of the flight route.
Under certain conditions, radio-electronic impact can reduce the accuracy of guidance, cause a deviation from the set course, or disrupt the stability of flight. At the same time, the result of such an impact is not guaranteed and depends on many factors: the duration of the action, the power of the signal, the type of navigation system, and the specific conditions of the terrain.
It is important to understand: EW does not «shoot down» Shaheds. Its role is to complicate the execution of a task by the drone and reduce the effectiveness of an attack, and not to completely eliminate the threat.
What Tasks EW Can Solve in Countering Shaheds
In the fight against Shaheds, EW performs an auxiliary function. Its main task is to reduce the accuracy of strikes and gain time for the response of other elements of the defense.
In this context, mobile complexes are also applied. For example, the vehicle-mounted modular complex EW «Hrets XL» is used for the local cover of movement routes, positions, or objects of increased risk. Thanks to their modular design, such solutions can adapt to specific tasks, but they are not intended for the independent interception of Shaheds and do not replace air defense systems.
EW in this case works as a tool for reducing the effectiveness of an attack, and not as a self-sufficient protection asset.
Limitations of EW During Kamikaze Drone Attacks
The key limitation of EW in countering Shaheds is the autonomous operating mode of these drones. Even in conditions of the disruption of satellite navigation, the craft can continue flight at the expense of internal navigation systems.
The effectiveness of electronic warfare also decreases during massed attacks, the use of different frequencies, difficult terrain, or combined flight routes. That is precisely why EW cannot be considered a universal or self-sufficient tool for protection from Shaheds.
Typical Mistakes When Using EW Against Shaheds
The most common mistake is the overestimation of the capabilities of EW. The expectation of the complete neutralization of Shaheds by means of radio-electronic impact leads to erroneous decisions in defense planning.
Another critical mistake is working without an understanding of the current frequencies and modes of application. Without this, even powerful EW assets can be ineffective. This aspect is examined in more detail in the article: «EW frequencies — which to choose?», which complements the topic with practical technical explanations.
The Place of EW in the System of Countering Shaheds
In the system of countering Shaheds, EW is only one of the elements of multi-level protection. It complements air defense, engineering solutions, camouflage, and organizational measures, but does not replace them.
Effective defense is built on a comprehensive approach, where each tool has a clearly defined role. Electronic warfare in this system works to reduce the effectiveness of attacks and increase the overall resilience of the defense.
Conclusions
EW against Shaheds has limited but important capabilities. It does not guarantee the destruction of kamikaze drones, but it is able to reduce the accuracy of strikes and gain critically important time for a response.
The best result is achieved when electronic warfare is integrated into a comprehensive system of countering aerial threats and is applied with a clear understanding of its real capabilities and limitations.
