On January 14, 2026, Mykhailo Fedorov — who had previously spent more than six years heading the Ministry of Digital Transformation and serving as Deputy Prime Minister — took charge of the Ministry of Defense. Over half a year in office (from January 14 to June 15, 2026), he managed to launch a number of ambitious reforms. DefPulse breaks down what the minister declared at the outset, what actually took effect, and what remained at the level of statements.
What Fedorov Brought to the Ministry
Fedorov’s arrival at the Ministry of Defense was presented as an attempt to “make the cost of war for Russia something it cannot sustain”. The new minister planned to focus on data, technology, transparent procurement, and algorithmic resource management. At the Ministry of Digital Transformation, for example, the emphasis on digital products (Diia, Army+, Reserve+) had delivered fast and measurable results.
The minister’s mandate covered three areas:
- Technological transformation of the battlefield.
- Cleansing the procurement system of corruption and monopolies.
- Structural reform of the army and mobilization.
In Fedorov’s summary report, published on the day of his resignation, his team counted 22 key achievements — primarily from the first and second areas.
What Worked
Let us review which of the Ministry of Defense’s plans were actually implemented.
Battlefield Technologies
The most well-known public result is Operation “Ashan.” According to Fedorov, the Ministry of Defense took part in strategic planning together with units of the National Guard’s Lasar’s Group and the 412th Separate Brigade of Unmanned Systems NEMESIS. The operation proceeded in two stages: in May 2026, strikes against equipment deep in the rear (up to 50 km) put 949 targets out of action over three days, and in June 2026 the counter-battery stage struck 231 targets (171 fully destroyed) over two nights. In total — 1,180 targets hit, which, according to the ministry’s estimates, slowed Russia’s mechanized offensive by approximately six months.
In parallel, the “Drone Line” program was scaled up: by early 2026 it comprised more than 1,000 UAV crews, and the kill zone expanded by 10–15 km on certain sections of the front. The CIA Director stated that a Russian recruit lives on the front in Ukraine for 20–30 minutes.
In May 2026, the “Drone Line” was integrated into the digital marketplace DOT-Chain Defence: five of the most successful combat units received their own budgets and the ability to order drones and electronic warfare systems directly, bypassing bureaucratic processes. As a result, in less than two weeks the units placed orders worth UAH 184.8 million, of which UAH 40.8 million was promptly funded. The project received international backing — in particular, an agreement on scaling it up was reached with Dutch Defence Minister Dilan Yeşilgöz-Zegerius.
Procurement Reform
This is arguably the most profound structural change during Fedorov’s tenure as minister — and at the same time it subsequently became the primary source of criticism from the military command.
From his first days in office, Fedorov ordered a sweeping audit of the central apparatus and brigades which, according to media reports, uncovered overspending and financial violations totalling UAH 300 billion. Officials involved in procurement were required to undergo polygraph testing. Those who refused or failed the check were dismissed without compromise.
Drone tenders were shifted from procurement of specific models to procurement based on tactical and technical specifications (TTS). This step eliminated the mechanism of “tailoring” a tender to a single manufacturer. As a result of demonopolization, natural market competition emerged among six manufacturers for 155 mm ammunition, reducing the expected contract value by 16%. Transparent tenders for the first 5,000 pickup trucks saved more than one billion hryvnias, while the cancellation of artificially inflated requirements for ATVs saved approximately 7,000 dollars per unit.
NATO for the first time in history agreed to provide direct financial and expert support to Ukraine’s Defense Procurement Agency (DOT) through the UK Special Adviser’s Office. This step is intended to protect the reform from being rolled back after a change of leadership.
Air Defense and Diplomacy
In his summary of his work, Fedorov stated that following the integration of Pavlo (Lazar) Yelizarov into the Air Force and the introduction of mandatory debriefings after every mass attack, the interception rate for cruise missiles rose from 47% to 87%, and for Shahed-type strike drones from 83% to 91%.
The new minister’s Ramstein meeting was also held in February 2026, where, according to Fedorov’s statements, “together with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, the Ukrainian delegation was literally collecting Patriot missiles a few at a time from each of approximately 50 delegations.”
Following three sessions of the Ramstein Contact Group, partners confirmed $40 billion in support for 2026. At that same February Ramstein meeting, Ukraine and Germany signed the first contract since the start of the full-scale invasion for PAC-2 GEM-T anti-ballistic missiles, with deliveries to begin in 2027. A batch of PAC-3 missiles is additionally being procured through a European credit facility.
A contract for Swedish Gripen fighters was also signed — in addition to 16 older C/D variants that Sweden will transfer by early 2027, in July 2026 Ukraine verified a separate agreement to purchase 16 new Gripen E aircraft worth approximately $2.54 billion. Deliveries are expected as early as 2027. The aircraft are viewed as a means of countering carriers of guided aerial bombs.
Ukrainian Ballistics
On July 14, 2026, the day the government resigned, a test launch of a domestically developed ballistic missile took place. According to Fedorov, the missile hit its target “with almost no deviation from course.” He also stated that changing the technical requirements reduced the missile’s production cost by approximately 30%.
Declarations That Were Not Fulfilled
There are several areas of work by the Ministry of Defense team under Fedorov that, for various reasons, remained “on paper.”
Structural Reform of the Army
An audit of combat units found that approximately one-sixth of Ukraine’s 120 brigades were chronically ineffective due to weak and incompetent leadership. The Ministry of Defense proposed disbanding or merging such units, redistributing personnel, weapons, and budgets to effective commanders, and consolidating army corps along stable, contiguous front-line sectors (primarily because some brigades had been on the front line for up to 200 days instead of the standard 40).
The initiative was not implemented: instead of consolidation, the General Staff began forming three new brigades from scratch.
It is worth noting, however, that questions of forming, disbanding, and reassigning brigades sit at the intersection of institutional responsibilities. Operational command of troops and personnel decisions regarding brigades have traditionally fallen within the authority of the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief, not the Minister of Defense.
Mobilization Reform
Contracts with clear terms and guaranteed deferrals, increased pay for infantry and assault troops, a legal market for foreign recruitment, new tools for returning servicemembers who are absent without leave — all of this remained largely at the level of statements.
According to Fedorov in a podcast with Sternenko, the Ministry of Defense managed to make progress mainly on administrative matters: transferring 95% of Territorial Recruitment Center services online or to service centers (TsNAPs).
To sum up, all the Ministry of Defense’s unimplemented plans either required direct intervention in the General Staff’s area of responsibility or coordination with the military command.
The “Wall” Known as the General Staff?
The central contradiction of Fedorov’s tenure was a divergence in vision with Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi: whether the procurement of innovative weapons can be separated from the tactics of their employment, and who has the right to make decisions on redistributing resources among brigades.
According to The Economist, at a meeting in early July 2026 the confrontation between the minister and the generals became public: the generals criticized the procurement of missiles and ammunition, and accused Fedorov of “PR repackaging” of existing processes and excessive “gamification” of war at the expense of less visible but critically important tasks.
On July 14, 2026, the Verkhovna Rada voted to dismiss the government of Yuliia Svyrydenko. In the new government of Serhii Koretskyi, Fedorov’s candidacy was not put forward for consideration. He declined alternative posts — Prime Minister or head of the Ministry of Digital Transformation. Late in the evening of July 15 he publicly confirmed his departure with the words “It was a great honor to serve the Ukrainian people,” and his advisers Serhii Sternenko and Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov subsequently announced their own resignations. Fedorov later cited pressure caused by the defense procurement reform as the reason for his removal.
On the morning of July 16, the first “cardboard” protest in support of Fedorov began at Ivan Franko Square in Kyiv — similar in format to last year’s demonstrations in support of NABU and SAP. Protests with cardboard placards bearing no party symbols took place the same day in nearly two dozen cities, and subsequently recurred regularly: notably on July 19, participants were already explicitly demanding Syrskyi’s dismissal and Fedorov’s return.
From July 17 to 20, the duties of minister were temporarily assigned to Major General Yevhen Khmara — previously head of the SBU’s Centre for Special Operations “A” and acting head of the SBU. The President publicly explained the choice by Khmara’s “strong security work” and experience in people management, and announced his intention to subsequently submit his candidacy for full parliamentary appointment.
On July 21, Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed Syrskyi and appointed Mykhailo Drapatyi as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Ihor Skybiuk became the new Chief of the General Staff.
On August 6, 2026, Fedorov confirmed that he had not received a clear refusal from the President regarding a possible return to the post, and did not rule out such a scenario. He also stated that he was the first, after his dismissal, to hand Khmara the developed “Air-Land-Economy” defense development plan, personally explaining the document’s rationale. He further confirmed that he continues personal communication with Elon Musk regarding the use of Starlink for guiding Ukrainian drones to targets in Russia. This same topic was raised by Volodymyr Zelenskyy during his meeting with Trump at the end of July.
What from His Work Survived the Resignation
As of early August, a number of the technological and procurement mechanisms continue to function independently of personnel changes: the algorithmic supply of drones to brigades, as well as NATO’s institutional support for DOT and DOT-Chain. On July 29, Drapatyi officially confirmed the launch of a comprehensive audit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: an assessment of combat readiness, supply, personnel training, and management effectiveness. Thus the structural army reform that Fedorov initiated has in effect begun to be implemented under new leadership at the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.