The Marine Corps, long considered a symbol of offensive power, is now undergoing a period of transformation. Massive amphibious landings under cover of naval gunfire — as at Inchon in 1950 — have been left to the history books. Yet marines are not being disbanded; on the contrary: the United States is standing up new missile battalions, Japan is expanding its own forces, and Ukraine is deploying a separate corps. Classic approaches are fading into history, but the Marine Corps is acquiring a new role. DefPulse breaks down the nuances.
Amphibious Operations — a Gamble
The history of the Marine Corps is a history of doubt. In 1915, the Allies landed at Gallipoli and became bogged down on the cliffs for months. That military failure entrenched skepticism about the effectiveness of amphibious assaults for decades.
Yet in 1950, General MacArthur dared to land at Inchon — and won, because he bet on surprise. Meanwhile, in 1982, the British landed in the Falklands and lost ships to Exocet missile strikes, even though the enemy was weaker and fighting far from home.
History has shown: an amphibious assault succeeds when the enemy cannot spot and strike the ships in time.
Today, however, stealth is unattainable: a ship’s course can be tracked by satellite, by a reconnaissance drone, or even by a coastal radar. Not to mention that a vessel can be struck many miles from shore by an unmanned surface drone.
That is why, since the second half of the last century, marines have been trained not as a “force for a surprise assault” but as a “first-response force.” After 2001, American marines spent years fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan as conventional ground troops. That experience blurred the marines’ core skill — combat at the seam of sea and land.
America: No Tanks, but Missiles
The United States Marine Corps is the most striking example of abandoning classical approaches. The Force Design program initiated by General David Berger transformed the Corps: tank battalions and towed artillery disappeared, replaced by littoral regiments. Instead of tanks — missiles and drones.
The modern concept: small groups that hide on islands and coastlines near the enemy, track ships, and provide targeting data to launch systems. The primary weapon is NMESIS — an unmanned launcher on a JLTV chassis that fires two Naval Strike Missiles with a range of over 300 km:
- in April, the Navy proposed procuring 32 new launchers and 103 missiles in the FY2027 budget request;
- in June, NMESIS systems and MADIS air-defense systems were received by the 12th Littoral Regiment on Okinawa;
- in October, the artillery battalion of the 10th Regiment at Camp Lejeune was converted into the Corps’ first-ever medium-range missile battalion.
According to the October 2025 update, Marine Corps squads consist of 13 personnel, including a soldier who launches small drones for precision strikes. To support these formations, 257 wheeled ACV armored vehicles and more than 5,000 JLTV armored off-road vehicles have already been delivered.
Britain, Japan, China: Three Models
Britain: Back to the Commandos
In June 2026, at Windsor Castle, King Charles III presented new colors to 40, 42, 43, and 45 Commando and announced that the brigade formerly known as 3 Commando Brigade was henceforth the UK Commando Force. The transformation had been underway since 2017 and produced new ships, unmanned systems, and digital capabilities — all oriented toward small-group operations, primarily in the High North: a RUSI study published in July 2026 identifies the Arctic as the priority theater for the Royal Marines.
Japan: Marines Absent for Half a Century
After 1945, Tokyo had no marine corps. The Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) appeared in 2018 — directly in response to security concerns over the Nansei and Senkaku islands near the Chinese fleet. According to Wikipedia, by 2024 it had expanded to three regiments and approximately 3,400 personnel. In February 2026, during Exercise Iron Fist 26, the Japanese practiced amphibious landings alongside more than 2,400 American marines on Tanegashima Island.
China: A Marine Corps That Grows and “Americanizes”
Analysts note that China’s marines are increasingly resembling their traditional American counterparts. In other words, Beijing is practicing the classic ship-to-shore landing as it was conducted in the twentieth century.
Russia: Marines as Ordinary Infantry
According to a Small Wars Journal review, the 40th, 61st, 155th, and 810th brigades served in Syria, then operated in southern Ukraine during the encirclement of Mariupol, and later fought in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. That path came at a steep cost for the occupiers: the 810th and 155th brigades had to be reconstituted multiple times. There are records of 2,218 confirmed marine fatalities. The elite assault troops that, “by the book,” are meant to operate with precision in specific operations were used by the occupier as ordinary infantry.
The situation is compounded by the fact that, according to Ukrainian estimates, approximately 30% of the Black Sea Fleet has been lost or damaged. Thus the elite brigades found themselves without their primary instrument — the sea. They are therefore doing what the entire Russian army does: storming positions without adequate fire support.
Ukraine: From Chaiky to a Corps
Theorists like to cite the Zaporozhian Cossacks on their chaiky boats, calling them the first Ukrainian marine infantry.
The Ukrainian Marine Corps as a regular military formation was officially established on 23 May 1918, when Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky ordered the formation of a marine brigade comprising three regiments. That date is now a professional holiday.
After Ukraine regained independence, the Marine Corps was reborn as part of the Navy. But in 2014, the occupation of Crimea dealt the fleet a severe blow: Ukraine lost most of its naval vessels, and many servicemen faced a choice — remain in service under the occupiers or continue serving Ukraine.
Nearly eight years later, in 2022, the Ukrainian frigate Hetman Sahaidachny had to be scuttled to prevent it from falling into Russian hands. At the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine effectively had no capable surface fleet that could confront the Russian Black Sea Fleet on equal terms. According to the Carnegie Endowment, it was precisely asymmetric means — missiles, maritime drones, and precision strikes — that made it possible to shift the balance of power at sea.
Meanwhile, the Marine Corps was increasingly fighting in roles typical of infantry units, artillery, reconnaissance, and logistics. Its transformation was forced and took place against the backdrop of change across the entire Ukrainian military.
Ukrainian Marine Corps: Three Historic Turning Points
First — 2014: The Loss of Crimea
Following the occupation of Crimea, Ukraine lost most of its fleet, military bases on the peninsula, and a significant share of its naval infrastructure. Marines who remained loyal to their oath continued serving on Ukrainian-controlled territory.
This changed the conditions in which the Marine Corps had to operate. Coastal defense, ground combat operations, and coordination with other branches became increasingly important.
Second — 2022–2024: From Mariupol to Krynky
During the full-scale invasion, marines participated in the defense of Mariupol and Mykolaiv, as well as fighting in the Kherson direction. They operated primarily as ground infantry.
In October 2023, Ukrainian marines crossed the Dnipro and established a bridgehead in the Krynky area on the left bank. It was a complex operation due to the wide water obstacle, the enemy’s fire control, and supply difficulties. According to Kyiv Post, in the final stage of the fighting fewer than 200 Ukrainian troops remained in the area. In July 2024, the marines withdrew from their positions at Krynky. The operation demonstrated that classical approaches to marine missions no longer work: change was needed.
Third — 2023–2026: The Corps and Unmanned Systems
Ukraine is transitioning from a brigade-based model to a full corps-level command for the Marine Corps. The 30th Corps unites combat brigades with artillery, reconnaissance, communications, engineer support, electronic warfare, and unmanned systems units. Its development is ongoing. The Corps’ official website describes its missions: coastal defense, amphibious operations, assault on fortified positions, and deep reconnaissance.
In 2025, the 426th Separate Regiment was formed on the basis of the 426th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion and incorporated into the Corps. It employs reconnaissance and strike UAVs as well as other unmanned platforms. A “Contract 18–24” program with special service terms has been launched to attract young operators.
From 1 March 2026, three additional brigades — the 34th, 39th, and 40th, previously belonging to coastal defense — were officially transferred to the Marine Corps.
In September 2026, the 30th Corps received a new commander. On 1 October, Major General Dmytro Deliatytskyi announced that he was handing over command of the Corps and would take charge of the Naval Forces’ Marine Corps. Among his priorities: unified training standards, development of the non-commissioned officer corps, professional command, and the ability to operate on land, at sea, and in the air.
“We continue the same mission. Positions change. Responsibility remains,” Deliatytskyi summarized in his address.
What Model Is Taking Shape?
Ukraine is not abandoning maritime warfare, but it is changing the way it wages it. Restoring numerical parity in large surface vessels against Russia is virtually impossible. Command is therefore emphasizing a combination of coastal missile systems, maritime drones, reconnaissance, aerial and ground unmanned systems, and precision strikes against enemy ships, bases, and logistics. This asymmetric model has helped degrade the Russian fleet.
The new missions of the Marine Corps in the absence of a fleet are to hold and reclaim territory, operate along the coast, conduct amphibious operations, and deliver combined-arms superiority. The corps structure is intended to integrate infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and unmanned systems into a unified command system.
It is clear that this step is a forced one, and naval vessels have not been abandoned. They are still needed for protecting sea lines of communication, mine countermeasures, patrol duties, and other tasks that drones alone cannot fully perform. However, the experience of full-scale war has shown that the marines’ strength lies in the ability to detect the enemy, deliver precision strikes, and deny it freedom of action.
Lessons of the War
Amphibious assault was once a strike force for a specific mission; now it is part of the main force with its own reconnaissance, fire control elements, drones, and small boats.
Instead of direct combat, marines of the new generation can operate from ambush — using medium-range missiles and strike UAVs.
The greatest vulnerability for classic amphibious operations is the absence of the element of surprise and weak logistics (when an assault group is inserted deep into enemy territory).
Effective marines are well-trained marines. That is why Ukraine is building its training program around unified standards and NCO preparation for small-unit operations.
